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Summary  findings
Cuddington surveys the recent literature on the  particularly important in industrial countries. Developing
sustainability of fiscal deficits, most of which focuses on  countries rely far more on seignorage to finance deficits,
the United States and other industrial countries, to see  although the degree of that reliance varies greatly among
how useful it might be in developing countries.  countries; the simultaneous presence of both domestic
The accounting  approach to analysis focuses on steady  and foreign-currency borrowing is central in a growing
states and assumes that a fiscal deficit (or surplus) that  number of developing countries;  and concessional
leads to unchanging debt/GDP ratios over time is  lending and grants may also be an important part of
sustainable. The data required to apply this approach are  fiscal finance.
relatively modest.  Cuddington  generalizes the PVC approach to
The present-value  constraint  (PVC) approach assumes  economies that use money-financing of deficits,
that the sustainability of fiscal policy depends ultimately  economies for which concessional financing is available,
on what level of fiscal deficit is financeable, which  and economies that incur both domestic and foreign
depends in turn of the behavior of lenders. Recent  debt.
empirical implementations of this approach concentrate  He proposes a possible compromise in approaches:
on methods for testing whether maintaining current  Rather than use time series techniques to describe
fiscal policy (as captured  by historical time series on  constant fiscal regimes, one can specify fiscal rules into
government spending, revenue, and debt) violates the  the foreseeable future based on country-specific
present-value-constraint or, equivalently, the no-Ponzi-  information about fiscal targets (perhaps as stated in IMF
game (NPG) condition. The econometric  methods used  stabilization programs). Then one can calculate the
in this literature  (such as tests for the presence of unit  implied time path for domestic and foreign debt, given
roots and cointegration) require long-time series over a  current debt levels as initial conditions. Using this
constant fiscal regime, requirements that may be  hypothesized time path for debt, one can ask whether it
unrealistic in many countries.  satisfies the no-Ponzi-game condition. If it does, fiscal
Typically, analyzing the sustainability of deficits in  policy is - by this definition - sustainable. If the NPG
developing countries involves issues that are not  condition is violated, fiscal policy is unsustainable.
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Fiscal Deficits in Developing Countries
by
John T. Cuddington
This paper surveys the recent literature analysing fiscal deficit sustainability, most of
which focuses on the U.S. and other industrial countries, in an attempt to assess its potential
usefulness in the developing country context.  Both the accounting approach and the present
value constraint (PVC) approach are considered.  Typically, sustainability analyses for
developing countries involve issues that are not particularly important in the industrial country
context.  Reliance on seigniorage to finance deficits is often quantitatively much more
important, although its use varies widely across LDCs.  The distinction between domestic and
foreign-currency borrowing is central; concessional lending and grants may also make an
important contribution to fiscal finance. We consider generalizations of  the PVC approach to
situations where money-financing of deficits is used and concessional financing is available.
The simultaneous presence of domestic and foreign debt, which characterizes a growing
number of LDCs, are also discussed.
JEL Classification:  F34 (International Lending and Debt Problems),
E62 (Fiscal Policy)
023  (Fiscal and Monetary Policy in Development)
001 1 (Macroeconomic Analyses of Economic Development)Analysing the Sustainability of
Fiscal Deficits in Developing Countries
"Sustainability"  is perhaps the most frequently used buzzword in economic policy
making circles in the 1990s: sustainable development, sustainable environmental policies,
sustainable debt and deficit levels.  In the macroeconomic context, policy makers and analysts
are frequently asked: Are current levels of fiscal deficits or levels of public-sector debt
sustainable? Are renewed capital inflows to LDCs in the early 1  990s sustainable?. 1 These
issues are important for developed and developing countries alike.
This paper surveys the recent literature analysing fiscal deficit (and, in some cases,
current account) sustainability,  most of which focuses on the U.S. and other industrial
countries, in an attempt to assess its potential usefulness in the LDC context.  Two conceptual
approaches have been used: the accounting approach the present value constraint (PVC)
approach.  Although we briefly summarize the former, our emphasis is the PVC approach.
The starting point for both is the (temporal) financing constraint of the government or
consolidated public sector, which is outlined in Section 1. The accounting approach to
sustainability  or macro policy consistency is discussed in Section 2.
The present value constraint or intertemporal budget constraint is derived in Section 3;
the appropriate interpretation of PVC "test" in the literature is then discussed: What does it
mean to "test" a budget constraint?  We argue that the PVC tests should not be interpreted as
tests of whether a government is "solvent" but rather as tests of whether its fiscal policy stance
is sustainable. That is, could the past behaviour of key fiscal variables and the implied fiscal
deficit or surplus, as captured by simple time series models in the econometric tests, be
continued indefinitely  without encountering resistance by lenders?  For this to be feasible, the
fiscal policy must not entail "Ponzi scheme" financing.
From this perspective, it is the behaviour (or "willingness")  of the government's
creditors that ultimately determines the sustainability of a fiscal policy. The no Ponzi game
(NPG) condition employed in Section 3 can, in some circumstances, be derived from or is
equivalent to the transversality condition in the lender's utility maximization problem. This is
V/  Of course, capital inflows to LDCs  might be desirable even if they are unsustainable.
Emphasizing  this point, Max Corden has quipped, "The growth of a child is not sustainable, but
desirable never the less!"
1taken up in Section 4, first in a deterministic setting and then in a more general stochastic
environment. (This section, which is somewhat more technical, can be omitted on first reading
without lose of continuity.)
Section 5 (and the spreadsheet examples in Appendix 2) provide some transparent
examples of sustainable and unsustainable fiscal policy in the simple case where only domestic
bond financing of fiscal deficits is possible. In reality, of course, fiscal rules are likely to be
more complicated. Rather than trying to characterize these rules, the econometric literature
testing the PVC focuses on time series properties of the primary surplus, debt, and in some
cases, government spending and taxation, without explicitly relating them via an economic
model to (presumably) endogenous variables like the real interest rate, GDP growth, inflation,
etc.
Ideally, the unit root and/or cointegration-based tests of sustainability  should employ
long time series (say 50-100 annual observations) on various macroeconomic variables. For
most LDCs, such long time series are typically not available, or are contaminated by one or
more "regime shifts" which invalidate the assumption that the data are all from the same data
generating process.  We discuss the possibility of describing fiscal policy rules based on
shorter time series combined with other country-specific information (such as the policy
conditions or targets articulated in a country's IMF and/or World Bank programs).  The
methods in the literature can then be used to study whether the continuation of these
hypothesized rules into the indefinite future is "sustainable" or whether this fiscal stance would
ultimately require levels of financing that lenders would find objectionable.
Section 6 discusses various econometric methods used to test sustainability of fiscal
policy. The empirical findings for U.S. fiscal policy are reviewed.  As the tests are based on
different auxiliary assumptions, they sometimes lead to different conclusions. These are
highlighted and the empirical validity of the auxiliary  assumptions is discussed.  Section 6
concludes with Ahmed and Roger's  (1995) extension of the PVC approach to the
simultaneous sustainability of current account deficits and fiscal deficits.
Sustainability  analyses for developing countries will in many cases involve issues that
are not particularly important in the industrial country context.  Reliance on seigniorage to
finance deficits is often quantitatively much more important, although its use varies widely
across LDCs.  The distinction between domestic and foreign-currency borrowing is surely
2central; concessional lending and grants may also make an important contribution to fiscal
finance. Section 7 considers generalizations of  the PVC approach to situations where money-
financing of deficits is used and concessional financing is available. The simultaneous presence
of domestic and foreign debt, which characterizes a growing number of LDCs, are also
discussed.  The literature typically aggregates the two types of debt and considers a single
NPG condition or PVC.  (See, e.g., Agenor and Montiel (1996, Chapter 4) .)  We argue that
correct treatment of this situation involves two separate "no Ponzi game" conditions, one for
domestic lenders and another for foreign lenders.
Section 8 concludes.
1.  The Consolidated Public-Sector Financing Constraint
Analyses of fiscal policy sustainability as well as discussions about the mutual
consistency of various macroeconomic objectives begin with the financing constraint of the
consolidated public sector including the central bank.  This constraint relates the conventional
deficit, i.e. the primary deficit plus nominal interest payments, to increases in internal and
external sources of financing, as follows:
ABt  + St  At  + AM,t =  SURPt+  +iBt  +  itB,,  (1)
where  B,, Bt*,  and MN  are domestic-currency debt instruments ("bonds"), foreign-currency
bonds, and the monetary base, respectively. The tilde (-) indicates nominal variables;  i,  and
i,  are nominal rates of return on domestic and foreign bonds.
For analytical  work, it is more convenient to rewrite (1) in real terms:
ABt  +  A(stB,*) +  AIM,  =  - SURPt  - ,M,,  +  rBt,l  +  (r,t  +  E,)Bt*  (2)
where the absence of tildes on the financial stocks and the deficit indicates real magnitudes, i.e.
nominal series deflated by the domestic GDP deflator. 2 rt  and  rt* are real rates of return on
2  Discussions of deficit sustainability focus on the relationship between real primary
surpluses  and the real value of debt. For most countries,  however, the bulk of debt is non-indexed
nominal debt.  In this context, Woodford (1995) points out that the determination of the price
level may depend on the total quantity of nominal liabilities  (monetary and nonmonetary) rather
3domestic and foreign bonds;  s, is the real exchange rate s,=S, P,*  /P, (where  P,* is the
foreign price level).  E,  is the real rate of depreciation of the domestic currency.
From (2),  it is clear that any attempt to determine what level of (real) primary fiscal
deficit (or surplus) is "sustainable" must involve assumptions about reliance on seigniorage, as
well as assumptions about the relative importance of domestic and foreign sources of debt
finance over time.  The present value constraint approach to sustainable fiscal policy was
initially  developed to study industrial countries.  It was assumed that seigniorage revenue was
unimportant and all public sector debt was denominated in domestic currency.  Under these
assumptions the financing constraint simplifies  to a simple dynamic equation relating the stock
of debt carried forward from the previous period, inclusive of interest, and the primary surplus
to next period's debt B,
B,  = (I+r,)B,  - SURP  . (3)
Bt is the outstanding debt at the end of period t  and  r, equals the expost  return on
government debt during period t.  As with (1), equation (3) may be interpreted in nominal or
real terms. On the other hand, the auxiliary assumptions required in the econometric tests
(discussed below in Section 6) are more likely to be satisfied if we consider real debt (i.e.
nominal debt divided by a same-currency price index such as the GDP deflator or CPI).
Hence,  r,  and SURP,  are interpreted as the  real interest rate and real primary surplus,
respectively, in what follows.
Given time paths for  r,  and SURP,  the government financing constraint in (3)
describes the time path of the stock of debt, i.e., the dynamics of debt accumulation or
decumulation.  Several things are apparent from (3):
*  If the government runs a primary surplus equal to zero (SURP, = 0), the stock of debt
will grow at a rate equal to the interest rate:
ABt  =  B, - Bt l  =  rBtBl  (4)
If the government runs a primary deficit (SURP, < 0), the stock of debt will grow at a
than just the nominal money supply.
4rate exceeding the interest rate. 3
*  If the government runs a primary surplus (SURP, > 0), the stock of debt will grow
more slowly than the interest rate.  If the surplus more than offsets interest payments
on existing debt (i.e. the conventional surplus,  SURP, + r, B,,  is positive), then the
debt will actually shrink over time.
Both the PVC tests of sustainability and the accounting approaches to the consistency
of macro policy targets begin from (3), or more generally (1).
2.  The Accounting Approach to Sustainability or Policy "Consistency"
The so-called accounting approach is sometimes viewed as an approach to fiscal
sustainability. Other authors interpret it as a way to assess the mutual consistency among a
number of macro policy targets.  In any event, the approach focuses a particular debt ratio,
typically debt to GDP, b, = B, /Yt.  Rewriting (3), which is in levels,  in terms of the
debt/GDP ratio yields:
BX  (l +rt)Bt  SJRP  (5)
Yt  (  +g,)YJ-§  Y
or:
b,  =  b,  I  - surp,  (6)
where g, is the growth rate in GDP between t-1 and t.  Using (6), the change in the debt/GDP
ratio equals:
lSb,  -b,  - b,  r  't  b,-  surp,  (7)
where  surp, =  SURPt/GDP,.  It follows immediately that:
If the primary surplus/GDP ratio is equal to zero, the debt/GDP ratio will grow (or
3/ For a constant deficit,  however, the growth rate of the debt falls asymptotically toward
r.
rshrink) at the rate  r-g.
*  If the government runs a primary deficit (surplus), the debt/GDP ratio will grow at a
rate exceeding (less than)  r-g.
In the accounting approach, a primary deficit (or surplus) is defined as sustainable if it
generates a constant (rather than ever-increasing) debt/GDP ratio, given a specified GDP
growth target and constant real interest rate.  Thus, in the simple case where seigniorage
revenue and foreign borrowing are ignored, the sustainable primary surplus to GDP ratio is
determined by setting the change in the debt/GDP ratio in (7) equal to zero:
surp,  = r' -gt  b  (8)
1  +gr
This is the level of the primary surplus that would be required each year to keep the debt/GDP
ratio constant at its current level b.
Applications of the accounting approach invariably consider the possibility of using
seigniorage revenue as a source of fiscal finance. In this case, surp  in (8) should be
interpreted as the primary surplus plus sustainable seigniorage revenue (as a ratio of GDP).
The latter is calculated by assuming that the ratio of real high-powered money to GDP is a
negative function of the inflation rate.  The target inflation rate is then used to calculate the
steady-state monetary base/GDP ratio and the resulting seigniorage.  (See Anand and van
Wijnbergen  (1989) for a thorough discussion of this approach and an interesting application to
Turkey.)
The accounting approach has also been used to assess the consistency among various
macroeconomic policy targets. 4 Suppose the government has the following policy targets
(denoted by *): (i) a constant debt/GDP ratio b*, (ii) a target GDP growth rate equal to g*
and (iii) a primary surplus/GDP ratio equal to surp*.  Are these policies targets mutually
consistent?  In addressing this question, the accounting approach typically assumes that
changes in the primary surplus will have no effect on either real interest rates or GDP growth.
4Oftentimes  the literature  calls this an analysis  of  "policy consistency." This is potentially
misleading  in it is referring  to the consistency  of policy targets, such as GDP growth or the target
debt ratio, rather than the policy instruments, which are directly controlled by the policy maker.
6This is surely unrealistic. Presumably, the equilibrium  real interest rate depends positively on
the level of government spending and/or the amount borrowed.  To answer the above
question, one would ideally use a model that endogenously determines real interest rates and
the GDP growth rate.  It would then be possible to analyze how these key macro variables are
affected by changes in fiscal policy variables.
Although the accounting approach focuses on steady-state debt ratios, the
corresponding dynamic equation in (6) could be employed to ask various questions about
transitional dynamics. For example, what time path of adjustment in the primary surplus over
x years will result in a specified fall in the debt/GDP ratio?  Would a debt write off be helpful
in achieving  this debt ratio target?
The primary shortcoming of the accounting approach is that it attempts to determine
the "financable" fiscal deficit by making assumptions that liabilities  can continue to grow at the
growth rate of the economy's GDP, so that debt/GDP ratios remains constant.  This leaves
rather vague the role that lenders ultimately play in determining what debt strategies are
"sustainable" and which are not.  The PVC approach is more explicit in this regard.
3.  The Present Value Constraint Approach
The PVC approach begins with the government financing constraint in level [i.e. (3)
above] and iterates it forward N periods to get:
-N  SrwPt,+  BN+1
Br  I  =EJ=  (I(+ry+l  (l+ryV)l  (9)
In deriving (9) from (3), it has been assumed for expositional simplicity that the (expected)
real interest rate is constant over time.  A generalization to time varying interest rates is
7considered below.  Some of the econometric tests in Section 5 require the (strong) assumption
that the expected real interest rate is constant; others require only the assumption that the real
interest rate is stationary. 5
At this point the co-called "no Ponzi game" (NPG) condition is invoked to argue that
the last term in (9) goes to zero in the limit:
ImN-  B.+  =  0.  (10)
(I +r)rNt
This condition states that the present value of the government's debt in the indefinite future
converges to zero.  For this to happen, real debt B (in the numerator) must grow more slowly
than the real interest rate (which is the growth rate of the denominator).
The NPG condition is typically  justified by arguing that lenders would presumably not
be willing to allow the government to perpetually pay their entire current interest obligation
merely by borrowing more.  If lenders were willing to do this, (4) shows that the debt would
grow at a rate equal to the interest rate.  Hence the discounted debt in (10) would not
converge to zero.  Section 4 below discussed the NPG condition and its relationship to the
transversality condition in the lender's intertemporal utility maximization problem in greater
detail.
Imposing the NPG condition in (9) implies that the government debt at any point in
time  must equal the present value of its expected future primary surpluses:
Bt,I  =  Ss-o  1SURPt  (11)
s Even this assumption is not uncontroversial. See Rose (1988).
8Note that the real interest rate must be positive for the present value of future surpluses to be
finite.  David Wilcox (1989, pp. 291-2) elaborates in the importance ofthe  PVC:
Fiscal policy is constrained by the need to finance the deficit. Virtually any
pattern of deficits would be sustainable if it were possible to borrow money, and pay
the interest by borrowing more.  Indeed, in some model economies it is possible for the
government to do exactly that (Diamond 1965).  In those economies, which are labeled
dynamically inefficient, an increase in current debt has no implications for future
surpluses.  Governments in dynamically efficient economies, on the other hand, face a
present-value borrowing constraint, so-called because it states that the current market
value of the debt equals the discounted sum of expected future surpluses.
Interpreting Econometric Tests of the PVC or NPG Condition
The recent empirical literature,  initiated by the seminal contribution of Hamilton and
Flavin (1986), tests the validity of  the PVC in (11) or equivalently the NPG condition (10).
There is a question of how to interpret such tests.  What does it mean to "test" a budget
constraint?  Some authors have interpreted tests of (10 or ( 11) as "solvency" tests.  For
example, Agenor and Montiel (1996, 123) argue that:
The government is solvent if the expected present value of the future resources
available to it for debt service is at least equal to the face value of its initial [i.e.
current] debt stock.  Under these circumstances, the government will be able to service
its debt on market terms.  Solvency  thus requires that the government's prospective
fiscal plans satisfy the present-value budget constraint...
On the other hand,  an optimizing government should never plan to have a stream of future
primary surpluses with a NPV strictly in excess of its current debt, because this would imply
lower government spending and/or higher taxes than necessary to service the debt.
Other writers interpret the PVC tests as tests of the "sustainability" of current fiscal
policy. Wilcox (1989, pp.293-4) contains an interesting discussion on how to interpret
apparent violations of the PVC:
Hamilton and Flavin view their tests as shedding light on whether the government must
satisfy the borrowing constraint.  If  [the NPG condition in (10) or the PVC in (11)]
9were violated in the data, Hamilton and Flavin would conclude that the borrowing
constraint need not be satisfied. By contrast, I regard the necessity of the present-
value borrowing constraint in a dynamically  efficient economy as established on
theoretical grounds.. .This suggests a natural definition for the concept of sustainability:
a sustainable fiscal policy is one that would be expected to generate a sequence of debt
and deficits such that the present-value borrowing constraint would hold....  Moreover,
an unsustainable policy would be expected to change...
If the present-value borrowing constraint does not hold, what will be the form
of the violation?
Hakkio and Rush (1991, p.429) also interpret their PVC tests as tests of the sustainability  of
current fiscal policy:
Is the [U.S.] budget deficit "too large?" Yes.  Specifically,  we find that recent spending
and tax policies of the government -- if continued -- violate the government's
intertemporal budget constraint.  As a result government sending must be reduced
and/or tax revenues must be increased.
The authors state explicitly that they are testing whether the NPG condition would be satisfied
if government revenue and expenditure continued to follow  their past stochastic processes.
I conclude that the PVC tests are appropriately viewed as tests of the sustainability of
the current fiscal policy stance, as reflected in the historical times series data on government
spending, revenue, deficits, and/or debt, not as solvency tests.  An analysis of solvency would
have to consider all conceivable government policies, and ask whether there is any
economically and politically  feasible policy stance that would satisfy the PVC, given the value
of  current debt. If there is none, then the government is insolvent.
In the U.S. context, it is reasonable to assume that government expenditure or tax
policies would ultimately have to change in order to bring the projected stream of discounted
future primary surpluses into line with the PVC in situations where the current fiscal policy is
unsustainable.  In the LDC context, on the other hand, inflationary surprises to wipe out debt
obligations and/or debt repudiation (or threatening debt repudiation in order to secure more
favorable terms from creditors) may be entertained as policy options.  Presumably this arises
10when the political or economic costs of adjusting government expenditures or taxes become
too high relative to the costs of debt repudiation.  In short, LDC governments may become
"unwilling to pay" before they reach the point where they are "unable to pay" or insolvent.
Sustainability Tests Involving Debt Ratios
In order to relate the PVC tests to the accounting approach below, it is interesting to
recast NPG condition in (10) or equivalently the PVC in (11) in terms of ratios.  Interestingly,
an analysis  based on ratios is often motivated by the argument that this is more appropriate for
growing economies.  For example, Hakkio and Rush (1991, p.430) note:
In addition to examining real spending and revenue directly, we also normalize these
variables by real GDP and population.  This is an important extension beyond previous
work since McCallum (1984), among others, deems these ratios -- per capita spending
and revenue as a fraction of GNP -- as more pertinent for a growing economy.
I believe this statement is false when applied to GDP growth, but may be valid when
population growth is involved.
Consider the government financing constraint (3) in levels.  One can always rewrite
this constraint with all variables expressed in terms of ratios to any variable that one might
care choose, be it GDP, population, or whatever (i.e. the world output of bananas).  Defining
bt = B, /Yt as the relevant ratio (e.g., using the debt to GDP ratio in (5) above), the
government financing constraint in (3) can be rewritten by dividing through by Y, and using
the identity:
Yt (1 +g,)  Yt  (12)
where g, is the growth rate in GDP between t-  1 and t.  The result looks like (5) above.
Assuming for simplicity  that r and g are constant over time, recursive forward substitution in
11(3), using the definition in (13), yields an expression analogous to (9), but in ratio form:
N  1+g  tJ)  SUR 1
,  I +g  (N+)  BN±l  (13)
1+r  N, 1
The NPG condition now appears to take the form:
limN[  1 1  B  0  (14)
1  +r  YN'-
Note that for the PVC or NPG conditions expressed in ratio terms as in (13) or (14),
respectively, the appropriate discount factor (1+g)/(I+r) takes into account the growth rate of
the variable is used in the denominator of the ratio.  Hakkio and Rush (1991, p.430) explain:
When variables are nominal, the discount factor is the nominal interest rate; when
variables are real, it is the real interest rate; when variables are real per real GNP, it is
the real interest rate minus the rate of growth of real GNP; and when variables are real
per capita, it is the real interest rate minus the rate of population growth.
At first glance, the NPG condition (14) seems to require that r>g.  In fact, this is not the case.
The NPG condition in (14) is identical to that in (10).  Using the identity in (12), it is easy to
see that (14) does not depend on the growth rate in Y (regardless of whether Y is real income
or some other variable). By similar reasoning,  it can be shown that the PVC written in terms
of ratios does not depend on g either:
b,  (1 +r)i)SURP,t  x-  (1+r)  '' 1)SURPj(
Given the above result that the conversion of the PVC and NPG conditions into ratio
form leaves them unaffected, it is troublesome that empirical analyses sometimes arrive at
different conclusions using level and ratio data.  (See especially Hakkio and Rush (1991).)  A
key issue when implementing  the PVC tests is the stationarity of the variables being used.  For
12cointegration based tests, the variables in the cointegrating relationship must be I(l).  It
possible that level series are I(l),  but the ratio series are I(0).  Thus, the decision to transform
the PVC into ratios may make the auxiliary assumptions associated with various tests
(highlighted  in Table I below) more or less plausible.
When are the relative magnitudes of the real interest rate and the growth rate of
income relevant?  Section 5 provides an illustration where the process determining primary
surplus SURP, is assumed proportional to GDP.  In this case, the present value constraint can
be rewritten in terms of ratios to GDP and the difference between the real interest rate and the
growth rate.
Before leaving the discussion of the debt/GDP ratio, it should be noted that in some of
the literature on fiscal deficit sustainability, a different definition of sustainability is used.
Fiscal policy is said to be sustainable if the time path of the debt/GDP ratio is bounded, i.e.
does not continue to grow without limit. 6 Is this criterion stronger than the PV constraint?
Under circumstances where the real interest rate is higher than the growth rate of GDP, the
boundedness of debt to GDP is indeed a stronger criterion than the PV constraint.  The PV
constraint requires that the growth rate of debt be less than the real interest rate.  This does
not rule out the possibility that debt GDP ratio increases without bound.  If the real interest
rate is higher than GDP growth rate and the growth rate of debt is in between them, the PV
constraint is satisfied but the debt GDP ratio explodes over time.  On the other hand, if debt
GDP ratio is bounded, the growth rate of debt has to be less than or at most equal to the GDP
growth rate. Given the real interest rate is higher than the growth rate of GDP, PVC is
certainly satisfied.
6 Hakkio and Rush (1991), for example,  test both the PV constraint and the boundedness
of debt/GDP ratio.
134.  Optimal Lender Behavior and the No Ponzi Game Condition 7
The purpose of this section is to discuss the situations where the NPG condition can be
derived from the lender's utility optimization problem.  The deterministic case with zero
population growth is a benchmark case.  The cases of positive population growth and a
stochastic economy are then considered in turn.
McCallum (1984) considers a dynamical  efficient economy in steady state equilibrium.
Assuming a constant interest rate (as in (9) above), he shows that the NPG condition follows
immediately  from the transversality condition of the lender's utility maximization problem.
That is, the NPG condition is an implication of optimal behavior by lenders. (See Appendix I
for details).  Thus, Ponzi financing should not be possible if lenders are rational in
deterministic models with constant population.
Rational Ponzi Games
O'Connell and Zeldes (1988) discuss the possibility of rational Ponzi games.  They
explain how such schemes can arise when an economy's population is growing over time and
where there is no (or, at least, not universal) intergenerational altruism:
New agents are born into the economy and fend for themselves. The key point here is
that while each individual will satisfy his own transversality condition, this will not
suffice to rule out rational Ponzi games.  Even though each individual's wealth will not
be growing faster than the inverse discount factor, population growth may make it
possible for aggregate desired wealth to grow at the rate of interest or faster.  Ponzi
games are therefore feasible in an economy with infinite-lived  agents. (p.438)
Interestingly, they note that:
when borrowers are running rational Ponzi schemes, this does not imply that lenders
are in any sense losing out.  In the models we study in this paper, rational Ponzi games
are only feasible when the economy is in a dynamically  Pareto inefficient equilibrium.
The introduction of perpetually rolled over debt will never make the lending economy
worse off and will in general make it better off relative to a world in which no Ponzi
game is run. (p.433).
Presumably, however, the lending economy could make itself even better off  by having its
own government rather than foreigners run the Ponzi game!!
In sum, the O'Connell and Zeldes (1988) analysis concludes that when the relevant
population of  lenders is growing, a modest Ponzi scheme is feasible. The transversality
'This section may be omitted on first reading without loss of continuity.
14condition of individuals will imply that, if the population is growing a rate n, say, the
government debt must grow at a rate less than  r+n, not a rate less than  r  as presumed in the
various sustainability tests.  The transversality condition for an individual lender in economies
with growing populations equals:
Bv
lim  BN  =  O(  16) "MN--  (1 +r)N(l  +nf1
where BN  is the aggregate stock of debt and hence BN  /(1+n)N  is debt per capita.  The
government must insure that debt per capita grows at a rate less than the interest rate in order
to satisfy the transversality conditions of all lenders in the economy.  Thus, when the lender
population is growing, sustainability  tests should be based on the ratios of debt and the
primary surplus to the population.  Taking ratios to GDP, on the other hand, is potentially
confusing and in any event has no bearing on the PVC or NPG tests (as shown at the end of
Section 3), regardless of whether GDP in either the debtor or creditor economy is growing.
Transversality Conditions in Uncertain Environments
Bohn (1995) notes that the following two empirical observations can not be reconciled
in a deterministic setting: (i) the interest rates on U.S. government bonds have been
significantly  below the average rate of the economic growth and (ii) according to the empirical
analysis in Abel et al (1989), the U.S. economy is dynamic efficient. He goes on to argue that
"these two things can happen together only in a stochastic environment."  Hence, it is more
appropriate to examine the sustainability of fiscal policy by using tests that are derived from
stochastic models of the economy.
The PVC in (11) and the NPG condition in (10) were derived under the assumption of
constant real return on government debt. Here we relax that assumption by deriving the
corresponding conditions for the case where the ex post return on government debt  r,  is
stochastic and hence may vary from period to period.  With non-constant  r,, forward
iteration of the government financing constraint in (3) and taking expectations yields:
Bt l  =  EtEj  Oq ,+,SURPI+,  +  Etqt+NBt+N  (17)
15where
ITj  - =O(I  +r,,,)  (18)
is the compound discount factor relevant for period t+j cashflows. The NPG condition,
therefore, equals:
limN__ Eq,B,N=  0  (19)
The resulting PVC is:
B,  l  =  EfEj=o qtjSURP 1 j  (20)
What is the general constraint on government borrowing in a stochastic setting?  As
Bohn (1995) shows, the lender's intertemporal budget constraint can be written as:
(1 +r 1)B,I  =  7 0 E,(s,t,SURP 1 )  +  limN_.Ef[sr,(l  +rI±N)Bt  N  1]  (21)
where st+N  =  pNu'(ct+N)/u'(ct)  is the lender's marginal rate of intertemporal substitution
between periods t and t+N.  (1 +r 1)B,l is the lender's wealth (inclusive of interest earned
between t- 1 and t) going into period t.  The transversality condition requires that the lender's
present valuation of future government liabilities,  the last term on the right-hand-side of (2 1),
should go to zero in the limit:
limN_.oEt[stsN(l  +r,N)BtN-I  0  (22)
The resulting PVC, therefore, equals:
(1 +rt)B,-  l=  j=o  Et[st+SURP  +,]  (23)
16Notice that (22) and (23) are different from (10) and (11) in that they use the marginal rate of
intertemporal substitution instead of the real interest rate as the discount factor.
The marginal rate of substitution is closely related to the risk-free interest rate.  The
Euler equation from the consumer's optimization problem implies that at period t the risk-free
rate r*  is related to the one-period marginal substitution as follows:
1  - .ttl  *  (24)
1 +r,
Under the assumptions that: (i)  there is no correlation between s, and st+1  for all t and (ii)
there is no correlation between st+N  and BtIN,8 (22) can be written as:
limN_  E,  [qt+N  BN]  0  (25)
Under these assumptions, therefore, the appropriate discount factor is the risk-free interest
rate from the lender's standpoint instead of the inverse of one plus the real interest rate on
government debt. This suggests that if one is testing the NPG condition for the Brazilian
government's external debt, say, the appropriate interest rate is LIBOR, not the actual real
interest rate on Brazilian debt.  This is because LIBOR is a reasonable estimate of the lender's
risk-free rate.  Thus, in evaluating the NPG in (10), the discount factor should be the lender's
risk-free rate.  The real interest rate faced by the borrower, on the other hand, is relevant for
determining the time path of BtIN  (via the difference equation in  (3)).
Under more general assumptions where there are significant correlations between s,
and st+j  and between s,+j  and B,j  , the transversality condition in (22) does not directly imply
the a no Ponzi game condition like (25) holds.
When the NPG condition is not a direct implication of the lender's transversality
condition, is it still an implication of optimal behaviour by lenders? The answer is yes.  As
long as the household utility function u is strictly increasing and bounded, violation of the
NPG condition cannot be consistent with optimal household behavior.  If the NPG condition,
or equivalently the PVC, is violated, it can be shown that a reallocation of the household's
'This  assumption implies that any risk associated with B, is diversifiable risk, so that
investors do not demand a risk premium in addition to the risk-free rate.
17consumption over time in a way that satisfies the NPG condition, will raise expected utility:
E,E,o  ,Biu(c,+,,m,+,)
Hence, it can not be optimal for lender's to allow Ponzi game finance.
To prove the foregoing claim, first discount the period t+j household temporal budget
constraint back to period t.  This can be done by multiplying  both sides of the period t+j
temporal budget constraint by qt+ 1 as defined above for j=O,  1,..,N.  Add the N+l  discounted
temporal budget constraints together and take expectations of both sides to obtain:
Et[c,+q+l,,cl+ ,**+q,  ,Nq  N]  +  Et[qt,ABt  N]  - (I+r,- 1 )Bt-I
N ~  ~~-(  +  rpl+  tj  t't  ~1.(26) EtZEJ  o qt,j[k,+1)-t1,,j  - (I  + Trtt)Ad,jt + M,+j - k,l  + kt+j].
Now suppose for the sake of argument that the present value constraint in (26) did not hold.
That is, there exists some large N such that  E,[q,+NBI+N]  >  0.  In this case, it is clear that the
household can raise its consumption  c, without altering its consumption in the other periods
before t+N.  Under the assumption that the utility function u is strictly increasing and
bounded, a sufficiently  large N would make such a reallocation superior to the allocation
where E,[q,+NB 1+N]  > 0.  Therefore, a violation of the present value constraint (26) is not
consistent with the utility maximization by the lender.
Most of the literature testing the NPG condition has assumed that the appropriate
discount rate is the real interest rate on government debt (rather than the risk-free rate).  In
light of the above discussion, these tests are valid even in a stochastic economy.  On the other
hand, for a stochastic economy the transversality condition is different from the NPG
condition and also a constraint on government borrowing.  Therefore, it appears that a valid
test of sustainability can be based on (23) or (26).
5.  An Illustrative Example of Sustainable Fiscal Policy
This section lays out simple examples of sustainable and nonsustainable fiscal policies.
Consider an economy where GDP (Y) grows exogenously at rate g (independent of the level
18of government spending and income taxation). 9 The government's fiscal policy rule is a very
simple one: (1) keep government spending G constant as a fraction of GDP, i.e. y = G/Y,  is
constant; (2) tax all income with a flat tax at rate t = T/Y, with no other sources of revenue;
(3) finance any resulting deficit resulting from the policies in (1) and (2) by issuing (domestic-
currency) bonds at a constant real interest rate r.  With this fiscal policy package, the resulting
primary surplus equals:
SURL, =  (-  _  y)  y,  (27)
With our simple assumptions, SURP grows over time at rate g, the growth rate of real income.
SURP,  =  (T  - Y)YO(1  +g)  . (28)
Given the outstanding debt from the previous period, Bt , the government financing constraint
in (3) describes the dynamics of debt accumulation. Iterating (3) forward and inserting (28)
for all of the  SURPt terms to captures the stance of fiscal policy stance yields:
SURPO  (_-Y)Yo  (29)
Bo  =
r-g  r-g
provided that the real interest rate r exceeds the growth rate g  (r>g).  When g>r, which
implies that the economy is dynamically inefficient, the summation of discounted future
surpluses in the PVC is infinite.
Is the above fiscal policy package "sustainable?" The calculation is straightforward.
Find the NPV of the steam of future surpluses, defined by the right-hand-side of (29).  If  this
NPV exceeds (falls short of) the current debt, the policy package is "sustainable"
(unsustainable) in the sense that it does not violate the government's intertemporal budget
constraint. 10
9/ This is obviously  restrictive. The recent growth literature  argues that fiscal policy can
affect the economy's growth rate.  See, e.g., the model in Barro (1991).
'0Whether  it is politically feasible to "sustain" this policy stance is, of course, a different
matter and not the one being tested in the PVC literature.
19If the PV of future surpluses is negative, the fiscal policy is unsustainable regardless of
the current debt level. To reiterate, if the fiscal stance implies a perpetual primary deficit, no
amount of debt reduction can make the fiscal stance sustainable. On the other hand, if the PV
of future surpluses is positive but less than the value of current debt, a write-off of  debt equal
to the difference:
B  ( 0 r -(y)Yo
r-g
would restore fiscal policy sustainability. The ability to generate a primary surplus is a
precondition for a successful debt reduction program.
Note that in situations where SURP is proportional to GDP and r and g are constant
over time, (29) can be rewritten in terms ofthe  debt/GDP ratio."  The fiscal stance is
sustainable if:
surpo  - (30)
r-g  r-g
Here, in contrast to the discussion in Section 2, the choice of denominator for the ratio on the
right-hand-side of (15) can not be chosen arbitrarily; it depends what variable SURP is
hypothesized to be proportional to.  Furthermore, in deriving (30) from (11) r must be greater
than g (or the infinite sum in (11) will not converge).
The foregoing example is illustrative. For more complicated time paths of government
spending and taxation and a prespecified initial debt level, it is straightforward to implement
fiscal policy sustainability analysis using a standard spreadsheet program.  See Appendix 2.
6.  Econometric Tests of Sustainability
Several recent studies on fiscal deficit sustainability  for U.S. fiscal policy are
summarized in Table 1. These studies are based on different empirical tests, which in turn
" Here's a slightly  different  application  of the formula. Consider an EMS country wishing
to keep its debt/GDP ratio at the Maastricht treaty target of 60%.  What primary surplus to GDP
ratio is required for the fiscal stance to be sustainable? If the real interest rate is 5% and the GDP
growth rate is 2%, it is easy to show using (30) that the primary surplus ratio must be 1.8%.
20depend on the validity of different auxiliary assumptions.  Hence, they may yield (and in
practice have yielded) different conclusions regarding fiscal sustainability. This section
describes the various empirical approaches and attempts to explain and reconcile the various
findings.
The tests are classified into two groups.  The first involves tests derived from the NPG
condition using the real interest rate as the discount rate.  The second group of tests is based
on the transversality condition using marginal rate of substitution as discount factor.
Table I
Recent Studies of Fiscal Policy Sustainability
Study  Country/  Data Requirements  Auxiliarv  Test  Conclusions
Sample  Assumptions  Methods
Flavin-  U.S.  real primary  surplus  plus  Test  stationary  ol  Both are
Hamilton  1960-84  seigniorage,  fiscal deficit and  stationary,
(1986)  real stock of debt  (at market  debt.  implying
value)  sustainable  fiscal
policy.
Wilcox  U.S.  Market value  of gov't  debt;  Debt  follows  Test whether  Weak evidence
(1989)  1960-84  ex-post  real return  on gov't  general  ARIMA  discounted  debt  that discounted
debt.  process  series  is stationary  debt  is stationary,
with mean  zero.  yet its mean  is
nonzero.  Hence,
fiscal policy is nol
sustainable.
Trehan and  U.S.  real government  spending,  constant  real  Test whether  Reject
Walsh (1988)  1890-1986  real interest  payments,  interest rate  fiscal deficit  nonstationarity,
real revenue,  seigniorage  inclusive  of real  implying  fiscal
G. T may be  interest  payments  policy  is
stationary  or  is stationary.  sustainable.
nonstationary
Trehan  and  U.S.  Flavin-Hamilton  dataset  Real  return on  Test for  First difference  ot'
Walsh (1991)  1960-84  gov't  debt is  stationarity  of ()  stock of debt is
strictly positive,  real deficit  stationary,
but need not be  inclusive  of real  implying  fiscal
constant.  interest  or (2)  policy  is
first-difference  of  sustainable.
debt.
21Hakkio-Rush  U.S.  Real gov't revenue and  Real interest rate  Test whether gov't  A cointegration
(1991)  1950:JI-  spending inclusive of real  is stationary.  revenue and  relationship is
1988:IV  interest.  Gov't spending  spending inclusive  found for the
and revenue are  of interest are  entire sample, but
difference-  cointegrated.  not for the sub-





Corsetti-  OECD  Net general gov't debt; ex  Test stationarity of  Results are mnixed
Roubini  1960-89  post return on debt.  discounted debt  for OECD
(1991)  and the existence  countries studied.
of positive drift or
time trend.
Ahmed-  U.S. 1792-  Real gov't tax revenue,  st+j  G,* and  Test whether real  For both the U.S.
Rogers  1992  expenditure, and real interest  st+j  T,+ 1 are  gov't tax revenue,  and the U.K., a
(1995)  payments  difference  expenditure, and  cointegration
U.K.  stationary where  real interest  relationship with
1692-1992  s,, is the  lender's  payments are  vector  --
marginal rate of  cointegrated with  (-  1,  1,) is found,
substitution.  vector  implying that U.S.
(-1,1,1).  I )  fiscal policy is
sustainable.
Testing NPG condition
The literature testing the NPG condition originated with the pioneering work of
Hamilton and Flavin (1984).  They tested a version of the NPG condition where the ex post
real interest rate on government debt in each period  r,  was replaced by the average real
interest rate denoted by r.  This involves rewriting the government budget constraint (3) as:
B,=  (1 +r)B,,  - SURP,  + (r,-r)B,-l
(31)
(1  +r)Bt,l  - SURP,  + v,
where the error term  v,  captures the deviation of the interest rate from its average value.
Iterating forward yields:
B 1 limN-Bt+N(l +r)-(N+I)  + E-  (1 +r)-Q  ')SURPJ  + n  X  (32)
22where
n,  E  Sy=O  (I +r)  - +l)t
is assumed to be mean zero stationary.  Taking expectations on both sides of (32) yields:
Bt  l  =  Et Jim,N(  (I +r)-(N )B,,N + E,J=O  (I +r)  +'+)SURPP,j  (33)
Hamilton and Flavin test'2 whether
E,limN  _  (I +r)-(t+)B,+N =  °  (34)
or, equivalently:
=  E,1JO  (I +r)-U' 1)SURP,  . (35)
For situations where the expected rate of return on government debt is constant (i.e., E,r,+i  = r,
for i=1,2,...)  and  r,  is uncorrelated with SURP 5 and B, for all t and s," 3 the PVC in (20)
becomes (35).4
Hamilton and Flavin (1984) consider the class of debt processes satisfying
12 Equations  (34) or  (35) are also used in sustainability tests  by Trehan and Walsh
(1988,1991), Hakkio and Rush (1991), and Tanner and Liu (1994).
13  The assumption of no correlation between real interest rates and deficits or debt is a
very strong one. Presumably,  increases  in government spending  that lead to higher borrowing will
cause an increase in real interest rates (except in the case of a small open economy with perfect
capital mobility).
"Here  the PVC is expressed as the same form as the transversality condition derived in
Appendix 1.  Asymptotically it is no different than the expression in (34).  Because of the
algebraic manipulation in (31), however, the value of B,  in the two  expressions will differ
somewhat at finite horizons.
23EtlimN_,B,+N(1  +r)t+N  =  A0,  (36)
where Ao  can be any constant.  For this class of debt processes, the government budget
constraint in (32) can be rewritten as
Bt,I  =  Ao(l+r) t + ZJ.= 0 (I +r)(*I)SUJRP,,  + nt  (37)
Among  this class of debt processes,  only  those with A. = 0 satisfy  the PVC. Testing  the PVC
amounts  to testing  whether  A, is zero or not." 5 From (37), it can be seen  that if
Z-j=o  (I +r)-O+l  SURP  t  is stationary, A0  is equal to zero if and only if B,l  is also stationary.
Therefore,  if both SURPt and Bt are stationary  time series  processes,  the PVC in (35) will
necessarily  be satisfied.
Employing  augmented  Dicky  Fuller  (ADF)  tests for the presence  of unit roots,
Hamilton  and Flavin  (1984) reject  the null  hypotheses  that SURP,  and Bt are nonstationary.
Therefore,  they conclude  that the PVC holds,  implying  that U.S. fiscal  policy  is sustainable.
Kremers  (1988), however,  argues  convincingly  Hamilton  and  Flavin's ADF  regressions  were
misspecified  by not including  sufficient  lagged  differences  of the dependent  variable  to
eliminate  serially  correlation  in the residuals.  He claims  that the addition  of a second  lagged
dependent  variable  produces  a correctly  specified  regression. With  this specification,  the ADF
test indicates  that the debt series Bt  is nonstationary  due to the presence  of a unit root. He
therefore  concludes  that the PVC does not hold,  overturning  Hamilton  and  Flavin'  s conclusion
that U.S. fiscal  policy  is sustainable.
The Hamilton  and Flavin  method  is limited  in a couple  of respects. First, it assumes
'5Note that these tests have the same form as those testing for the  presence of
(deterministic)  speculative  bubbles  in financial  asset pricing  literature.
24the debt process is in the class satisfying (36).  Hence it is important to determine whether this
assumption is too restrictive.  Second, the Hamilton-Flavin test does not handle situations
where SURP, is nonstationary, yet this is not necessary for fiscal sustainability. Finally, it is
desirable to allow for stochastic expectations of the real rate of return in the sustainability
tests.
Trehan and Walsh (1991) extend the Hamilton and Flavin method in these two
respects.  First, they prove that the Hamilton and Flavin method is valid as long as the debt
series can be characterized as a general autoregressive moving average (ARIMA) process. It
does not have to satisfy (36) with AO  constant.  Trehan and Walsh demonstrate that if  SURPt
is stationary, the simplified  PVC (35) holds if and only if  B,  is also stationary.
Trehan and Walsh also construct sustainability  tests for situations where SURP,
happens to be a nonstationary time series process.  They do this by using the restriction that
(35) imposes on the time series properties of B,j  and SURP,. The particular proposition
derived in Trehan and Walsh (1991, proposition 1, p.209) is:
If the evolution of  B, is given by (3) with E(r,+,  I  I+j ) = r for all i 2 1  [a constant
expected interest rate] and  (1-XL)SURP,  is a mean zero stationary with [i.e. for some
A in the range]  0< X < (1+r), then [the NPG condition] holds if and only if there exists
a linear combination of SURP,  and  B,_l that is stationary.
The procedure for testing for the presence of this linear combination is as follows.
First, determine the value or range of values of A that make (I-XL)SURP,  a mean-zero
stationary series.  If STRP,  itselfis stationary, then (I-XL)S1JRP, must also be stationary for
all X in the range [0,1].  In this case,  (35) holds if and only if B,-l is also stationary.  This is
precisely the Hamilton-Flavin test.  In the situation where SURP, is difference stationary (i.e.,
X = 1), the PVC in (35) holds if and only if the conventional deficit, rB,,  - SURP 1, is
stationary. Thisimpliesthat  B 11 and  SURP,  are cointegrated with cointegration
25vector (r, -1).  Finally, for the case where the largest root in the  SURP,  process exceeds
unity but is less than 1+r (1< A < (1+r)),  (35) holds if and only if  SURP, and  B,1 are
cointegrated.  In this case, the cointegrating vector need not be (r,- 1).  The later is called the
"Trehan-Waish cointegration test" below.
Trehan and Walsh (1991) applied their cointegration test to U.S. debt and primary
deficits over the period 1964-1984, the same period employed in Hamilton and Flavin (1984).
Their statistical tests indicate that SURP, is stationary (i.e., 0 < X <  1), but B, is not.
Therefore they conclude that the government budget process is not sustainable.  This result is
consistent with the conclusion in Kremer's (1988) reconsideration of the Hamilton-Flavin
analysis.
The government temporal budget constraint (3) depends only on SURP, not its
decomposition into, say, non-interest government spending G and tax revenue T.  By
decomposing SURP in this way, however, it is possible to determine the restriction that the
PVC imposes on the time series properties of government spending and revenue.  Hakkio and
Rush (1991) propose testing the PVC in (34) by checking whether the government
expenditure inclusive of interest payment G, + rtBt,  is cointegrated with T, and whether the
cointegration vector is (1,-1).  The validity of their test depends on several auxiliary
assumptions: (i)  rt is stationary witl. unconditional mean r and (ii) both G, + (r,-r)B,-l and T,
follow unit root processes (i.e. the A = I case above).
Hakkio and Rush apply their test to U.S. data for the period 1950:11  to  1988:IV as
well as the sub-samples: 1964:I-1988:IV and 1976:1II-1988:IV. For the later two periods,
they conclude there is no cointegration between T, and G, + rB,-,.  Like Trehan and Walsh
and Kremers, therefore, they reach the conclusion that recent US fiscal policy is not
sustainable once the evidence from the 1980s is included in the dataset.  The similarity  in the
26Trehan-Waish and Hakkio-Rush findings is no coincidence.  If the auxiliary assumptions two
approaches are satisfied, the two tests are equivalent.  That is, if  Gt + r,B,,  is cointegrated
with Tt and the cointegration vector is (1,-i),  then
+I(G, + r,Bt,)  -17  =  rtBt-I  - SURP,  =  (r,-r)Bt-I  + rBt1 - SURPt  (38)
must be stationary.  The cointegration of  G, + rB,l  and T,  with a cointegration vector (1,-1)
means that the left-hand side of (38) is stationary.  Under the assumption that  r, is stationary
with unconditional mean r,  r, - r and hence  (r,-r)B, 1 are stationary.  Therefore, G, + r,B,  -T
is stationary if and only if  rBt,- - SURP, is stationary.
What if the assumption of a constant expected real rates of return on government debt
is not provide a good characterization of the data?'6 The Hakkio-Rush and Trehan-Walsh
cointegration tests, as well as the Hamilton-Flavin  test, are no longer valid.
Wilcox (1989) presents a stationarity test that does not require expected real interest
rates to be constant.  In the presence of stochastic expected real rates, one can use the ex post
real rates to discount the government debt outstanding in period t to a fixed point, say, period
0.  Then the time series characteristics of the discounted debt series q,,iB,+i  can be examined.
If this series is stationary with mean zero, then the NPG condition (25) must hold.  Applying
this test to US fiscal policy for the period 1960-1984, Wilcox finds that the discounted debt
series is not (mean) stationary.  We can not be sure from this evidence that recent US fiscal
policy is not sustainable, however,  since mean-zero stationary of  q,,iB,,i is only a sufficient,
6 Using data for eighteen OECD countries,  Rose's (1988) econometric examination of
nominal  interest rates and inflation rates implies that real interest rate are, in fact, nonstationary.
Even if the real rate was stationary, the assumption of a constant expected rate implies the
absence of serial correlation in the series, which is clearly contradicts the facts for U.S. T-bill
rates.
27not a necessary, condition for the PVC to hold.  Suppose, for example,  that q,+iB,+i  is
exponentially decaying toward zero, the PVC clearly holds even though the discounted debt
series is nonstationary.
Trehan and Walsh ( 1991, proposition 2) also present a test that allows for time-varying
expected real rates. They show that, if r, is a stochastic process strictly bounded below by
o>0, a sufficient condition for the present value constraint to hold is that (1-L)B, is stationary.
The reasoning behind this result is straightforward.  If B, is difference stationary, it can
contain a time trend of order no greater than one. Thus, B, grows at most linearly with the
time.  If real rates are strictly positive, the discount factor qt will decay exponentially.
Therefore the present value of B1, qt Bt,  must go to zero as t goes to infinity.
Applying this test to US fiscal policy for the period 1960 to 1984, Trehan and Walsh
found the first difference of debt to be stationary.  As this is a sufficient condition" for the
PVC to hold,  they conclude that the recent US fiscal policy is sustainable. Note that this
conclusion contradicts the results of their cointegration test discussed above. Trehan and
Walsh "interpret this finding to imply that the deficit process is consistent with sustainability,
but that the assumption of a constant expected real rate is a bad approximation to the data."
Testing the transversality condition in a stochastic economy
Ahmed and Rogers (1995) have recently derived the testable implications of the PVC
or NPG conditions in a stochastic economy [(22) or (23) above].  They take the first-
difference of the intertemporal budget constraint (21) and simplify  the resulting expression
17 Note that both the Wilcox test and the Trehan-Walsh stationarity test revolve around
sufficient conditions  for the debt process to satisfy  the present value constraint.  If these sufficient
conditions  are  violated,  therefore,  the  two  tests  are  inconclusive regarding  fiscal policy
sustainability.
28using the following form of the government's temporal budget constraint in (3):
(I +r,)B,-I  - (1 +rt-l)B,- 2 =  r,B,-I  - SURP,,
to get:
r1B11 - SURP_  - E  [AE 1(s  1 SURP,,)]  =  limv-  .AE[s,,N(I  +r,.N)BtN-l].  (39)
The transversality condition (22) implies that the limit term on the  right-hand side of (39) is
zero.  Provided that the first difference terms on the left-hand side are stationary, therefore,
r,Bt, - SURP,  must also be stationary for the transversality condition (22) to hold.
Decomposing  SITRP, into T, -G, yields the implication  that a necessary condition for the
transversality condition (22) to hold is the presence of cointegration among  G,,  r,-,B,  , and
T, with cointegrating vector (1,1,-1).  Equivalently, AB,  =  G, +r,- 1B 11 -T,  is stationary.
Ahmed and Rogers also show that this cointegrating relationship is also a sufficient
condition for the transversality condition (22) to hold provided the debt process falls within
the following class of time series processes:
Bt  =  + B,1 X  + 
Ahmed and Rogers apply their cointegration test to U.S. (U.K.) fiscal policy over the
very long sample period 1792 (1692) to 1992. They are unable to reject the hypothesis that
G,,  r,  1B,l , and T,  are cointegrated with vector (1, 1,-I).  They conclude, therefore, that the
PVC holds for the long period.  Their tests allows for changes in the dynamic relations among
variables during major wars, where a priori one might anticipate structural breaks to occur.
As discussed above, under certain assumptions the transversality condition (22) can be
transformed into (25) where the discount factor becomes the risk-free interest rate.  Following
29the same argument as in Wilcox (1989), stationarity of the discounted debt series (with mean
zero) is sufficient for (25) to hold.  Notice, however, the discount factor here should be risk-
free rate instead of expost  real interest rate on government debt.  In a deterministic economy
this does not make any difference. In a stochastic economy, the risk-free rate can be very
different than the real return on government debt.  Therefore, for a stochastic economy, to test
(22) or equivalently (25), one can test whether the discounted debt (using the risk-free rates)
is stationary and, if so, whether its mean is zero.
"Structural" Breaks
Several papers in the sustainability literature note that the time series characteristics of
fiscal variables may vary over time, exhibiting apparent "structural breaks" from time to time.
Wilcox (1989), for example, finds that the series of discounted debt q1+nB1+N  for the United
States was stationary prior to  1974 (1960-1974), but became non-stationary thereafter (1975-
1984). Tanner and Liu (1994) re-do the Hakkio and Rush (1991) test, adding a level-shift
dummy post 1982:1  to the cointegration relationship involving tax revenue and government
expenditure (inclusive of interest).  Their objective is to "to capture a shift in the fiscal process
in the first Reagan administration" (p.511).  They find that the Hakkio-Rush conclusions
regarding sustainability of U.S. fiscal policy are reversed once the break is taken into account.
That is, the deficit appears to be stationary and so potentially sustainable.  "
Note that in the context of U.S. fiscal policy, the issue is whether fiscal policy has
shifted from sustainable to unsustainable in recent years.  In many LDCs, in contrast, we will
be looking for instances where unsustainable polies were replaced with sustainable ones.
18/ The unit root with break-point  tests they employ allow for a one-time shift in the long-
run (cointegration) relationship but not the short-run dynamics involving government revenues
and expenditures.  This is fairly restrictive as a way of introducing shifts in fiscal policy.
30Do such  breaks  in the time series characteristics of these variables reflect fundamental
changes in the government budget process?  Was this change necessitated by the
unsustainable nature of fiscal policy prior to the "data break?"  Or is the change in the time
series properties of the data merely reflecting changes in short-run dynamics rather than long-
run relationships among fiscal variables? When there are data breaks, we should presumably
focus on the more recent government budget process instead of the government budget
process over the whole period if we want to assess the sustainability of current fiscal policy.
The entire data sample would be used in assessing the sustainability  of fiscal policy, past and
present, allowing for shifts in policies over time (perhaps caused by the desire to insure
sustainability).
Ahmed and Roger's  (1995) analysis of sustainability of fiscal and current accounts in
the United States and the United Kingdom includes annual data from 1792 and 1692,
respectively. The U.S. sample, therefore, includes major wars such as the civil war, World
War I and World War II.  The U.K. sample includes the wars of Spanish Succession, Austrian
Succession, the Seven Years' War, American Independence, wars with France, the Crimean
and Boer wars, and World Wars I and II.  The authors carry out a thorough analysis of the
cointegration relationship implying sustainability taking into account the above-mentioned
break points.  While the U.K. results are somewhat inconclusive, they conclude that: "despite
the recent U.S. twin deficits problem, the currently expected future course of fiscal policy
might plausibly be regarded as sustainable. However, it is clear that to formally conclude this
with any substantial degree of confidence--given the nature of the tests involved and the need
for a long span of data that we have argued for--must await the availability  of much more
data"  (p. 18).  In the LDC context, of course, the econometrician Oliver Twist would
certainly be chastised for calling out "More, Sir" after being given three hundred years of data.
31Over much shorter time spans, structural breaks are often frequent.  Thus, the sustainability
tests proposed by Ahmed and Rogers are unlikely to produce definitive conclusions about the
sustainability  of fiscal or current account imbalances in developing countries.
7.  The Application of the PVC Tests to Fiscal Policy in LDCs
Besides the disadvantage of demanding time-series data requirements, fiscal
sustainability  tests make several assumptions that make them less than ideal for application in
developing countries.  Seigniorage is often a  significant  source of financing for fiscal deficits.
For poorer LDCs, grants and concessional lending are may be an important source of funding
for both fiscal and net export imbalances. A large fraction of public debt may be denominated
in foreign currency. 19
Furthermore, the interesting empirical questions may be somewhat different. Rather
than asking whether a country's current fiscal policy stance has become unsustainable (which
has been the focus in the debate over U.S. fiscal deficits in the last decade or so), we may want
to know whether changes in a country's fiscal regime have moved it from a path that proved
to be unsustainable to a sustainable fiscal stance.  In principle, sustainability analysis be used to
see whether sustainability has been restored by considering periods before and after supposed
changes in fiscal regime. (See "Structural Breaks" above.)
Accounting for Seigniorage Revenue in Sustainability Analyses
The illustrative example of sustainable and nonsustainable fiscal policies in Section 5
ignored the possibility of financing the fiscal deficit at least in part via money creation.
19An additional complexity is that debt prices are often much less than 100, because of
default risk. In contrast, fluctuations in the market value of U.S. debt is primarily due to interest
rate changes.
32Hamilton and Flavin (1986, p.81 5), as well as many but not all of the subsequent studies,
define SURP as the fiscal surplus plus any seignorage revenue collected by the consolidated
public sector (i.e. government cum central bank):
M,
SlJRPt  =  7, - GJ  +  7t,  (40)
where  t 1 7  is the inflation rate and MIP  is the real monetary base.  Once the possibility of
money financing of deficits is introduced, a fiscal policy that implies primary fiscal deficits,
rather than surpluses, may become sustainable for governments with outstanding debt.
The treatment of seigniorage in the literature on the accounting approach to policy
consistency seems more thorough than that in the literature testing PVCs or NPG conditions.
In particular, the accounting approach (e.g., see Anand and van Wijnbergen (1989) and van
Wijnbergen (1990)) specifies inflation targets, and then uses estimates of the inflation semi-
elasticity of money demand to calculate the resulting seigniorage revenues.
The Presence of Concessional Debt
Governments in many developing countries receive grants or subsidized loans from
official  (bilateral or multilateral) institutions.  How can the availability  of such financing be
incorporated into sustainability analyses? An ambitious approach would be to attempt to
model the decision making processes of these institutions as they attempt to allocated available
resources among client (borrower) countries.  A more empirical approach would be to
assume that the time series characteristics of past concessional financing to an LDC
government would prevail into the indefinite future.  Alternatively, if one has specific
conjectures about the likely availability of future concessional financing, those financing flows
can be subtracted from the primary deficit, just as seigniorage revenue is, in order to come up
33with an adjusted primary SURP measure for use in PVC or NPG tests of the sort already
discussed.
In the case of official  lenders, any of the above approaches seem preferable to invoking
an assumption of rationality of the lenders, and then attempting to test the implied
transversality condition.  Presumably, a no Ponzi game condition does not apply to the
granting of aid flows or highly subsidized loan financing.
To apply tests on the present value constraint in the presence of concessional debt, we
propose separating the concessional debt and grants (which are just concessional debt with an
interest rate of-100%)  and nonconcessional debt.  Define concessional debt as B,c  and, as
before, let  Bt be nonconcessional debt.  Their respective rates of return as  rt  and r,c The
government financing constraint in (3) now becomes:
B,  - (I+r,-1)B, l  =  - AYIRP,  - BAc + (I+r,ct)B,c,  (41)
where the right-hand-side now equals the primary deficit inclusive of the net inflow of the
concessional debt financing.  Using (4 1) to describe the debt dynamics, sustainability tests
using the PVC can now be applied to the public sector's  nonconcessional borrowing.
Lending Foreign and Domestic Financing of Fiscal Deficits
Unlike the illustration in Section 5, the government financing constraint typically
reflects more than a single source of financing. Suppose that the government follows the fiscal
policy rule in Section 3 augmented by the following financing rule. Use the proportion x
(O<x<  1) of the primary surplus to pay down domestic debt and the remainder ( I-x) to pay
down foreign debt.  Conversely, finance primary deficits using the same proportion: x (I -x)
percent of any primary deficit should be financed by borrowing domestically (abroad).  This
34fiscal policy stance, which describes the time path of primary surpluses, and the following debt
accumulation equations for domestic (B) and foreign debt (B*), respectively, can be written as
follows:
Br = (I+r,)B, 1 - x  MJSRPI  (42)
B,  = (I +rt')B,  - (I -x)  StIRP,  . (43)
Substituting for SURP using (28) and substituting forward, it is straightforward to determine
the amount of domestic and foreign debt that will be outstanding at any future date if the
government adheres to its current fiscal policy and financing is forthcoming. 20 We then ask,
do these time paths for debt satisfy the NPG conditions for the domestic and foreign lenders,
respectively. The only tricky issue is what discount rate to use for each category of lender in
order to reflect their respective marginal rates of substitution in consumption.
Regarding the appropriate transversality conditions, O'Connell and Zeldes (1988)
emphasize that:
the feasibility of a rational Ponzi game depends on some key characteristics of the
economy whose agents are going to hold the debt.  For the case of external debt, this
means that the characteristics of the borrower's economy are irrelevant to the
feasibility  of perpetual debt rollover.  With regard to the Third World debt situation, it
follows that the feasibility  of perpetual rollover of debt depends on the performance of
the economy of the lenders -- in particular, on the relationships between real interest
rates, population growth rates, and growth in per capita income -- and not on that of
the borrowing countries. (pp.43 1-2).
Reiterating:
20The spreadsheet  developed  in  section  5  above  can  presumably be  extended  to
incorporate this distinction between the two types of debt.
35conditions in the borrower's  economy are irrelevant to the feasibility of Ponzi game
equilibria. As our analysis has shown, the feasibility of perpetual rollover of debt [their
so-called "rational Ponzi games"] depends entirely on conditions in the lender's
economy. To ensure the existence of an equilibrium  in which U.S. lenders forever hold
Argentinean debt that is growing at rate r, we need the growth rate of the U.S. (Not
the Argentine) economy [or, rather, the population] to exceed r. (P.446)
They go on to ask:
what happens if more than one individual or government tries to run a rational Ponzi
game?...If the U.S. government can run a rational Ponzi game in the U.S., what
prevents the government of Argentina or Nigeria from running its own Ponzi game in
the U.S." (pp.446-7.)
Perhaps competition among those borrowers wishing to use Ponzi game financing will result
in the bidding up of U.S. interest rates to the point where the Ponzi scheme financing no
longer exists.
8.  Conclusion
This paper considers two perspectives on the sustainability  of fiscal policy: accounting
approach and the present value constraint approach (PVC) approach.  Parallel approaches
have recently been developed in the literature for assessing current account sustainability (see,
e.g. Sheffrin and Woo (1990), Trehan and Walsh (1991), Husted (1992), Wickens and Uctum
(I 993), and Ahmed and Rogers (1995)).  The accounting approach focuses on steady-states
and assumes that a fiscal deficit (or surplus) that leads to unchanging debt/GDP ratios over
time is sustainable.  The data requirements to apply this approach are relatively modest.
The PVC approach begins from the premise that the sustainability of fiscal policy
ultimately depends on what level of deficit is financeable. This, in turn, depends on the
behaviour of  lenders.  Recent empirical implementations of this approach concentrate on
various methods for testing whether maintenance of the current fiscal policy stance, as
captured by  historical time series on government spending, revenue, and debt, violates the
36present value constrain or, equlivalentiy,  the no loiizi $a.  In order to use the
econometric methods used in this literature  (e  '  WstN h,  St,!iC  I  unit roots and
cointegration), one needs long time series  ovci ii  c  rliii  . . 'i  nI  These data
requirements may be demanding indeed in Ianal,.  j  diN  1*)'i 
A possible compronise  was oull  Ii  n-d 1n  S:,  P>  -isinl,  time series
techniques to describe constanit  fiscal  regimles OWii  >  ci  C  1  s.  .r',  !ile  into the foreseeable
future based on country-specific iiifor;nation  on !Is5  k  ti  w  :i' stated  in IMF
stabilization programs)  The impIlied  tiiI.  pai i  a  ) 6  ini  uI  '  d  i  Ii  t  ,l  ejI'11 d ebt, given current
debt levels as initial conditions, can thecn  bc cad!L:1a.Uid  1  iii,  th!  h%poilhesized  time path for
debt, one can then ask whether it satisies the  i(O :>  2i  ;  It  fit  does, fiscal policy
is -- by this definition -- sustainiable If the N  PG c- i  idt  i  i  !A;  ccl  Ii1scal  policy is
unsustainable.
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41Appendix 1:
Deriving the No Ponzi Game (NPG) Condition
from the Lender's Transversality Condition in a Deterministic Economy
For an economy can be represented by the following deterministic, aggregative,
flexible  price equilibrium model, McCallum (1984) has shown that, at the steady state, the
NPG condition  becomes the transversality condition for the household's optimization. A
sketch of his model follows.  The economy is composed of a large number of similar
households, each of which seeks at period t to maximize the intertemporal utility function:
Et=lI  p  t-I  (ct7m,),
where u is strictly increasing in both c and m (and u is bounded).  Here c, is household's
consumption at period t, and  mn  = MJ,P is the real money balance held by the household at
period t.  B  equals 1/(1+6), where 6>0 is the time preference parameter.
Each household has access to a constant return to scale production function using two
factors, labor and capital.  Since labor is fixed, the production function can be written as f(k,),
where  k,  is the stock of capital held at the start of period t.  The function f(k)  is assumed to
satisfy Inada conditions so that the economy will reach a steady state.  There are three types of
assets, namely, money, government bonds, and physical capital.
The household's budget constraint in real terms at period t can be written as:
ik)  - u,  =  c,  +  (l+1td)m,,  - mt  + h,  - (I+r,- 1 )bt-I  +  k,I  - k;(la)
where  ;r  is the lump-sum tax,  ,  is the inflation rate,  r,  is the ex post real interest rate on
government debt b,.
Given this setup, the Lagrangian for the household's optimization problem is:
L  =  St=  t` 1(u(c,m)
+  Wf(k,)  - -r  - c,  - (1 +ir)m,  + m:  - bt  + (1 +r,-,)b,-  - k,,  + k,]).
The first-order Euler conditions for the household's optimization are:
u1(ct,m,)  - 0;  =  O;  (2a)
Pu2(Ct±,mt=I) - At(1  +,t)  +  ,Bt,  I  =  0;  (3a)
42bt[-)t  + PX+(l +r)]  =  0;  (4a)
-t  +  3,X1(1+r)  <  o;  (5a)
i,  +  t+,[f(k,=d  +  1]  =  0;  (6a)
Corresponding to the three state variables m, b, and k, there are three transversality
conditions:
lim, -Mt+IP  '-I,(l  +T[,)  =  O;  (7a)
limt_kt,1P'-,  = 0;  (8a)
lim_btPt-1 X1  =  o.  (9a)
Conditions (la)-(6a)  are necessary for optimality while conditions (la)-(9a)  are jointly
sufficient.
The government budget identity expressed in per capita real terms is:
(l+Tc)mt, 1 - mt  +  b,  - (1+r,-1)bt, l=  gt  - r,;  (1  Oa)
where g, is the government expenditure. The right-hand side is the primary deficit, and the
left-hand side shows that the primary deficit can be financed either by issuing bonds or printing
money. The policy variables selected by the government are nominal money supply, MK,
government expenditure g 1, and lump-sum tax T,  Given these policy variables, the conditions
(la)-(6a),  and (IOa) describe the equilibrium paths for c,, kt, be,  it,  rt,  it,  and ni.
It can be shown that at the steady state the lender's transversality condition (9a) is
equivalent to the government's PVC in (1 1). To see this, the steady state of the economy
needs to be derived first.  At the steady state, inflation 7i, is zero,  kt, c, and m, are constant.
From condition (2a), this implies that X,  is also constant and positive.  Suppose that the
government debt b,  is positive at the steady state, as this is the case where sustainability
becomes relevant.  Then (6a) implies that r, is constant and equals to the time preference
parameter o.  At the steady state (9a) can be written as:
43lint-b,(l  +r)-('-')  =  O;
which is the NPG condition used in the text.
44Appendix 2
A Spreadsheet Implementation of
Fiscal Sustainability Analysis
The foregoing analysis of the sustainability of fiscal policy uses very simple rules:
spending and taxation are both assumed to be proportional to GDP.  This Appendix shows
how to implement fiscal sustainability analysis for arbitrary (i.e. nonconstant) time paths of
government spending and taxation and a prespecified initial debt level using a standard
spreadsheet program.  Whether the specified fiscal policy satisfies the present value constraint
(PVC) can be determined by examining NPVSURP-Debt (cell C23), which calculates the net
present value (using the specified time path for real interest rates) of fiscal surpluses minus the
initial stock of debt.  If  this value is nonnegative, fiscal policy is sustainable. Otherwise, it is
nonsustainable.  An equivalent test based on Wilcox (1989) is that the discounted value of
future debt must be non-positive in the limit as time goes to infinity (here, the year 2240).  See
row 24, which shows the debt in each period discounted back to the initial year 1990.
Table A2.1 shows an situation where the economy has real GDP and public-sector
debt both equal to  100 in 1990.  The primary fiscal deficit is 8 percent of GDP, as the share of
government (non-interest) spending is 30 of GDP, while revenues are 22 percent of GDP.
Clearly, this situation is unsustainable: NPVSURP-Debt(1990) = -$427.  The debt is growing
faster than the (average) interest rate, implying  that the discounted debt (cell IS24) is growing,
not approaching zero.  This suggests that Ponzi game financing would be needed to sustain
this fisdcal regime.
Table A2.2 shows the impact of a complete debt write-off by setting Debt(1990)=0.
The fiscal policy remains unsustainable, illustrating the point in the text that prnmary  surpluses
(at some point) are a precondition for a successful debt deruction program.
Returning to case where initial debt is 100, one can ask whether a specified fiscal
adjustment program would restore sustainability  of fiscal policy.  Suppose the tax ratio to
GDP is raised by 1 percentage point per year from 22 percent until it reaches 31 percent, nine
years later.  Table A2.3 shows that this large, albeit gradual, adjustment program is not
sufficient to restore sustainability.
Table A2.4 considers the same fiscal adjustment program, but accompanies it with
debt reduction.  Interestingly, even a 100% debt write-off is insufficient  to restore
sustainability. This is because the fiscal adjustment program is so slow that debt increases
dramatically during the early years of the program. By 2000 when the fiscal deficit has been
eliminated, the debt has grown from zero to almost $53, more than half of its pre-write-off
amount.
Table A2.5 shows the effect of rapid fiscal adjustment, with the primary deficit being
reduced 2 percent of GDP per year until a surplus of 2 percent is achieved five years later.
Still, fiscal is unsustainable, given the level of the initial debt (100).  The NPVSURP-Debt
value is still negative (-$46.6).  This tell us that the debt would have to be written down from
100 to no more than 53.4 (100-46.6), in conjunction with the fiscal adjustment, to achieve
45sustainability.  Then the program is  just  sustainable, leaving no leeway for adverse shocks in
the future.
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